How to Study Scientific Explanation? by Weber, Erik et al.
! HOW TO STUDY SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION?1 
 
 Erik Weber, Leen De Vreese & Jeroen Van Bouwel 
 
Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science 
Ghent University (UGent) 
Blandijnberg 2 
B-9000 Gent 
Belgium 
Erik.Weber@UGent.be 
Leen.DeVreese@UGent.be 
Jeroen.VanBouwel@UGent.be 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the working-method of three important philosophers of 
explanation: Carl Hempel, Philip Kitcher and Wesley Salmon. We argue that they do 
three things: (i) construct an explication in the sense of Carnap, which then is used as 
a tool to make (ii) descriptive and (iii) normative claims about the explanatory practice 
of scientists. We also show that they did well with respect to (i), but that they failed to 
give arguments for their descriptive and normative claims. We think it is the 
responsibility of current philosophers of explanation to go on where Hempel, Kitcher 
and Salmon failed. However, we should go on in a clever way. We call this clever way 
the “pragmatic approach to scientific explanation.” We clarify what this approach 
consists in and defend it.  
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 HOW TO STUDY SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION? 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This paper investigates the working-method of three important philosophers of 
explanation: Carl Hempel, Philip Kitcher and Wesley Salmon. We argue that they do 
three things: (i) construct an explication in the sense of Carnap, which then is used as 
a tool to make (ii) descriptive and (iii) normative claims about the explanatory practice 
of scientists.  In Section 2 – which has a preliminary character – we present Carnap’s 
view on what the task of explication is, on the requirements it has to satisfy and on its 
function. In Section 3 we show that Carl Hempel develops an explication of the concept 
of explanation and makes descriptive and normative claims with it. We also show that 
he fails to provide convincing arguments for these claims. In Section 4 and 5 we show 
that Philip Kitcher and Wesley Salmon had a similar working-method in their 
philosophical analysis of scientific explanation and failed at the same stage as Hempel: 
the arguments for the descriptive and normative claims are missing. 
We think it is the responsibility of current philosophers of explanation to go on where 
Hempel, Kitcher and Salmon failed. However, we should go on in a clever way. We call 
this clever way the “pragmatic approach to scientific explanation.” In Section 6 we 
clarify what this approach consists in and defend it.   
For readers who are not very well acquainted with the philosophical literature on 
scientific explanation, we have added an appendix containing a brief overview of 
Hempel’s DN-model and the problems that other philosophers saw in it. 
 
 
2. Carnap on explication 
 
Carnap devotes Chapter 1 of his Logical Foundations of Probability to the notion of 
explication. The following quote summarises his view: 
 
According to these considerations, the task of explication may be characterized as follows. If a 
concept is given as explicandum, the task consists in finding another concept as its explicatum 
which fulfils the following requirements to a sufficient degree.  
1. the explicatum is to be similar to the explicandum in such a way that, in most cases in which the 
explicandum has so far been used, the explicatum can be used; however, close similarity is not 
required, and considerable differences are permitted. 
2. The characterization of the explicatum, that is, the rules of its use (for instance, in the form of a 
definition), is to be given in an exact form, so as to introduce the explicatum into a well-connected 
system of scientific concepts.  
3. The explicatum is to be a fruitful concept, that is, useful for the formulation of many universal 
statements (empirical laws in the case of a nonlogical concept, logical theorems in the case of a 
logical concept). 
4. The explicatum should be as simple as possible; this means as simple as the more important 
requirements (1), (2), (3) permit. (1950, p. 7) 
 
According to Carnap, scientists often make explications. One of his examples is the 
replacement of the concept of Fish by the concept of Piscis: 
 
That the explicandum Fish has been replaced by the explicatum Piscis does not mean that the 
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former term can always be replaced by the latter; because of the difference in meaning just 
mentioned, this is obviously not the case. The former concept has been succeeded by the latter in 
this sense: the former is no longer necessary in scientific talk; most of what previously was said 
with the former can now be said with the help of the latter (though often in a different form, not by 
simple replacement). 
... 
... [T]he concept Piscis promised to be much more fruitful than any concept more similar to Fish. A 
scientific concept is the more fruitful the more it can be brought into connection with other 
concepts on the basis of observed facts; in other words, the more it can be used for the 
formulation of laws. The zoölogists found that the animals to which the concept Fish applies, that 
is, those living in water, have by far not as many other properties in common as the animals which 
live in water, are cold-blooded vertebrates, and have gills throughout life. Hence, the concept 
Piscis defined by these latter properties allows more general statements than any concept 
defined so as to be more similar to Fish; and this is what makes the concept Piscis more fruitful. 
(1950, p. 6) 
 
His second scientific example is Temperature as explicatum of Warmer: 
 
The concept Temperature may be regarded as an explicatum for the comparative concept 
Warmer. The first of the requirements for explicata discussed in §3, that of similarity or 
correspondence to the explicandum, means in the present case the following: The concept 
Temperature is to be such that, in most cases, if x is warmer than y (in the prescientific sense, 
based on the heat sensations of the skin), then the temperature of x is higher than that of y. (1950, 
p. 12). 
 
In both cases, the explicatum allows us to formulate more empirical laws than the 
explicandum, and that is why they are fruitful. 
According to Carnap, mathematicians also provide explications. For instance, the 
definitions of natural number as given by Russell and Whitehead in their Principia 
Mathematica are – in his view – explicata for prescientific arithmetical terms (numerals 
and operations). The fruitfulness of these explicata lies in the fact that “Peano’s axioms 
become provable theorems in logic” (1950, p.17). Logic is to be understood here as 
first order predicate calculus plus set theory. Here the fruitfulness lies in more 
theorems rather than more empirical laws (as already indicated in condition 3 in the 
first quote). 
Finally, Carnap claims that also philosophers often make explications. His aim in his 
1950 book is to develop a good explication of the concepts of probability and (degree 
of) confirmation. Before we turn to the use of the concept of explication by philosophers 
of explanation, it is important to note that the fruitfulness of philosophical explications 
may be of a different nature than the fruitfulness of scientific and mathematical ones. It 
is possible that the fruitfulness of philosophical explications lies in the formulation of 
empirical generalisations (like scientific explications) and/or logical theorems (like 
mathematical explications). But a serious option to consider is that their fruitfulness lies 
in that they allow us to offer clear guidelines for scientists (i.e. we formulate norms with 
them, not empirical generalisations or logical theorems). 
 
 
3. Hempel’s working-method 
 
Hempel’s first stage: explication 
It is clear that Hempel sees his covering law model as an explication in the sense of 
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Carnap. At the end of the long essay ‘Aspects of Scientific Explanation’ He writes: 
 
This construal, which has been set forth in detail in the preceding sections, does not claim simply 
to be descriptive of the explanations actually offered in empirical science; for - to mention but one 
reason - there is no sufficiently clear generally accepted understanding as to what counts as a 
scientific explanation. The construal here set forth is, rather, in the nature of an explication,  which 
is intended to replace a familiar but vague and ambiguous notion by a more precisely 
characterized and systematically fruitful and illuminating one. Actually, our explicatory analysis 
has not even led to a full definition of a precise “explicatum”-concept of scientific explanation; it 
purports only to make explicit some especially important aspects of such a concept. 
Like any other explication, the construal here put forward has to be justified by appropriate 
arguments. In our case, these have to show that the proposed construal does justice to such 
accounts as are generally agreed to be instances of scientific explanation, and that it affords a 
basis for a systematically fruitful logical and methodological analysis of the explanatory 
procedures used in empirical science. (1965, pp. 488-489) 
 
If we compare this with Carnap’s criteria, we notice the following: 
(1) Two of Carnap’s criteria are explicitly mentioned: fruitfulness and exactness. 
(2) Hempel does not mention similarity to the explicandum explicitly. However, 
proposals should do justice to what are generally agreed as instances of explanation 
(cfr. the last sentence of the quote). “Doing justice to” is vague, but we think it can 
safely be assumed to correspond to Carnap’s similarity: no exact match, but not too 
much dissimilarity. 
(3) Simplicity is not mentioned. Is it self-evident for Hempel that philosophers should be 
as simple as possible, or does Hempel think that simplicity is not a cognitive value for 
philosophers? Given how he proceeds, we bet on the first answer. 
Based on this comparison, it is reasonable to assume that Hempel’s idea of explication 
is the same as Carnap’s. 
  
Descriptive and normative claims 
Hempel has a clear view on the fruitfulness of philosophical models of explanation. 
This view is expressed in the following quote: 
 
As is made clear by our previous discussions, these models are not meant to describe how 
working scientists actually formulate their explanatory accounts. Their purpose is rather to 
indicate in reasonably precise terms the logical structure and the rationale of various ways in 
which empirical science answers explanation-seeking why-questions. (p. 412) 
The construal here broadly summarized is not, of course, susceptible to strict “proof”; its 
soundness has to be judged by the light it can shed on the rationale and force of explanatory 
accounts offered in different branches of empirical science. (p. 425) 
 
Hempel suggests here that his models give us insight in the logical structure of 
explanation (What do they look like?) and the rationale of explanations (Why do 
scientists construct them? Why are they valuable?). How this second aspect works can 
be seen in the following quote: 
 
Thus a D-N Explanation answers the question ‘Why did the explanandum-phenomenon occur?' 
by showing that the phenomenon resulted from certain particular circumstances, specified in C1, 
C2,...,Ck, in accordance with the laws L1, L2,...,Lr. By pointing this out, the argument shows that, 
given the particular circumstances and the laws in question, the occurrence of the phenomenon 
was to be expected; and it is in this sense that the explanation enables us to understand why the 
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phenomenon occurred. (p. 337). 
 
In other words: explanations provide understanding and the covering law models – 
according to Hempel – provide insight into what understanding really is. 
In claiming that his model gives insight in the logical structure of explanations and in 
connecting DN-explanation with expectability and understanding, Hempel puts forward 
the following descriptive hypothesis: 
 
All scientists who have understanding as an aim really seek DN-explanations, 
so that the phenomenon they want to understand becomes expectable. 
 
This hypothesis cannot be formulated without the explicatum. In this way, the 
explicatum is fruitful. In order to avoid misunderstanding of the descriptive claim, it is 
important to stress that is not a claim about what scientists or laymen call explanations. 
It is a claim about the intentions of scientists, about the kind of understanding they are 
after. 
In the quote above Hempel not only mentions “rationale” but also “force”. One of the 
insights we get from his models – in his view – is that non-causal explanations can be 
as good as causal explanations: they can have the same explanatory force. Therefore, 
there is no reason to demand that a good scientific explanation should be causal. 
Hempel states that it is unclear “what reason there would be denying the status of 
explanation to all accounts invoking occurrences that temporally succeed the event to 
be explained” (pp. 353-354). This view can be summarised in the following guideline: 
 
All scientists that are engaged in trying to understand the world should construct 
DN-explanations (and not necessarily something more specific, such as D-N 
explanations citing causes). 
 
This guideline cannot be formulated without the concept of DN-explanation. Again, this 
explicatum is fruitful: we can formulate a guideline that we cannot formulate without it.  
 
Hempel’s failures 
Let us now have a look at the problems. A first problem is that Hempel does not provide 
arguments for his descriptive claim. He does not provide a database with records of 
relevant opinions of a large representative sample of scientists from all disciplines all 
over the world (their opinions on what kind of understanding is important). However, 
that is what he should have done if he wanted to build a convincing argument for his 
empirical claim. If we compare what he does with what Carnap has in mind with 
“Piscis” and other scientific explicata, Hempel resembles a scientist who develops a 
nice explicatum concept, formulates an interesting hypothesis with it and then stops 
instead of trying to collect empirical evidence. Hempel stops where the real challenge 
starts: gathering evidence for his hypothesis by systematically investigating the 
opinions of a large representative sample of scientists (by interviewing them or 
analysing their writings). 
 Our criticism of Hempel is similar to the complaints of experimental philosophers 
about appeals to intuition in analytic philosophy: claims about what layman would say 
about a particular case are part of the argument for a philosophical theory, but 
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traditional philosophers don’t actually ask people what they think. More generally 
traditional philosophy (which experimental philosophers call armchair philosophy) 
does not use the standard empirical methods of the behavioural and social sciences 
while they do make descriptive claims about human attitudes, opinions, behaviour, etc. 
(see Knobe 2004 for a concise statement of what experimental philosophy is). 
The second problem is that Hempel does not give arguments for his normative 
claim. Why, for instance, are causal explanations not interesting in a special sense (i.e. 
in a sense different from the general one in which the set of DN-explanations, of which 
they are a subset, are interesting)? Again, he stops where the real challenge begins.  
 
 
4. Philip Kitcher’s working-method 
 
Kitcher versus Hempel 
In his paper ‘Explanatory Unification’ Philip Kitcher writes: 
 
Why should we want an account of explanation? Two reasons present themselves. Firstly, we 
would like to understand and to evaluate the popular claim that the natural sciences do not merely 
pile up unrelated items of knowledge of more or less practical significance, but that they increase 
our understanding of the world. A theory of explanation should show us how scientific explanation 
advances our understanding. ... Secondly, an account of explanation ought to enable us to 
comprehend and to arbitrate disputes in past and present science. Embryonic theories are often 
defended by appeal to their explanatory power. A theory of explanation should enable us to judge 
the adequacy of the defense. (1981, p. 508) 
 
The first reason Kitcher mentions is similar to what Hempel calls “rationale”. However, 
Kitcher claims that Hempel has it all wrong: understanding consists in unification, not in 
expectability. They have a common aim, but Kitcher thinks that Hempel has failed. 
Kitcher does not mention the concept of explication explicitly, but his model of 
explanation satisfies Carnap’s criteria: precise definition, similarity and fruitfulness 
(Kitcher formulates descriptive and normative hypotheses with it, see below). 
On the descriptive side, Kitcher puts forward two claims. The first is a negative one, 
a claim against Hempel: 
 
Scientists who have understanding as an aim often seek something more 
specific than DN-explanations. So Hempel’s descriptive hypothesis is false. 
 
This claim can be found at several places in Kitcher’s work. For instance, in 
commenting on Hempel’s covering law model he writes: 
 
Many derivations which are intuitively nonexplanatory meet the conditions of the model. (1981, p. 
508) 
 
The derivations which Kitcher has in mind are the whole bunch of counterexamples 
which several philosophers have launched against Hempel (cf. our Appendix). In order 
to understand Kitcher’s critique of Hempel properly, it is important to remind that they 
are not interested in what scientists and other people call explanations. They are 
interested in what understanding is. According to Kitcher, if you would present a 
scientist with the two derivations of the flagpole example (see Appendix) then this 
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scientist would say that the derivation of the length of the shadow from the height of the 
flagpole provides understanding, while the other derivation does not. So the first 
derivation would be judged as scientifically more interesting. Kitcher is convinced that 
scientists would judge similarly in other cases (e.g. the pendulum) and concludes that 
expectability is not the kind of understanding scientists are after. According to Hempel, 
scientists would judge that both derivations are equally interesting (the derivation of the 
height from the flagpole provides as much understanding as the other derivation). 
Similarly for the other cases such as the pendulum. Hempel concludes that 
expectability is the kind of understanding that scientists are after.  
 The problem with Kitcher’s line of reasoning is the same as with Hempel’s: he 
speculates about what scientists would answer when presented with a set of 
derivations and a corresponding question. He did not actually interview a 
representative sample of scientists. The result is that the dispute cannot be settled: 
both Hempel and Kitcher claim that if one would consult scientists, that would result in 
evidence supporting their hypotheses. They cannot both be right. 
  
Kitcher’s positive descriptive claim 
Kitcher also puts forward a positive descriptive claim: 
 
All scientists who have understanding as an aim really seek K-explanations, so 
that the phenomena they want to understand become more unified. 
 
“K-explanation” stands for “Kitcher-explanation”.2 An underlying idea of Kitcher is that, 
while all explanations are arguments, the converse is not true. He uses argument 
patterns to distinguish explanations from non-explanatory arguments. For an individual 
with knowledge K, an argument A can only be an explanation if it is acceptable relative 
to K (i.e. if the premises of A are members of K). But not all acceptable arguments are 
explanations: an acceptable argument is an explanation if and only if it instantiates an 
argument pattern that belongs to a privileged set of argument patterns. This set of 
argument patterns is privileged because it has a higher unifying power with respect to 
K than any other conceivable set of argument patterns. The unifying power of a set of 
argument patterns is determined by four factors: (i) it varies directly with the number of 
accepted sentences (i.e. the number of elements of K) that can be derived by means of 
acceptable arguments that instantiate a pattern in the set; (ii) it varies conversely with 
the number of patterns in the set; (iii) it varies directly with the stringency of its 
members; and (iv) it varies directly with the degree of similarity of its members. 
Here is a quote from Kitcher in which the positive descriptive claim is clearly present: 
 
Science advances our understanding of nature by showing us how to derive descriptions of many 
phenomena, using the same patterns of derivation again and again, and, in demonstrating this, it 
teaches us how to reduce the number of types of facts we have to accept as ultimate (or brute). 
(1989, p. 432; italics in original) 
 
In Kitcher's work on explanation no evidence for this second, positive claim can be !
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
3 !
There is no standard label, comparable to “DN” or “covering law” for Hempel’s views to denote 
explanations in the sense of Kitcher. So we introduce our own label here.
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found. He has not surveyed a large sample of scientists of various disciplines, in order 
to investigate what their views on understanding are. What he does is clarify the 
meaning of the claim (by developing his account of unification) but – like Hempel – he 
stops where the real challenge starts: gathering empirical evidence for the descriptive 
hypothesis. 
 
Kitcher’s normative claim 
Kitcher also puts forward a normative claim: 
 
All scientists that are engaged in trying to understand the world should construct 
K-explanations (nothing more, nothing less). 
 
This is a strong claim, because it excludes contrastive explanations (contrastive 
explanations are no arguments, so they are “less” than K-explanations) and implies 
that causal information is useless (causal explanations are “more” than 
K-explanations). Here is a quote from Kitcher in which he clearly expresses a 
normative aim: 
 
The most general problem of scientific explanation is to determine the conditions which must be 
met if science is to be used in answering an explanation-seeking question Q. I shall restrict my 
attention to explanation-seeking why-questions, and I shall attempt to determine the conditions 
under which an argument whose conclusion is S can be used to answer the question “Why is it the 
case that S?” (1981, p. 510; emphasis added) 
 
Kitcher does not argue for this normative claim either. Again, he stops where the real 
challenge starts. 
 
 
5. Wesley Salmon’s working method 
 
In Chapter 1 of Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World, Wesley 
Salmon explicitly puts himself in the tradition of explication: 
 
Many philosophical studies, including the one to which this book is devoted, aim at providing 
reasonably precise explications of fundamental concepts [.] (1984, p. 4) 
 
Like Hempel and Kitcher, he claims that his explication of the concept of scientific 
explanation provides insight into what understanding is: 
 
Our aim is to understand scientific understanding. We secure scientific understanding by 
providing scientific explanations; thus our main concern will be with the nature of scientific 
explanation. (p. ix) 
Scientific explanations can be given for such particular occurrences as the appearance of Halley’s 
comet in 1759 or the crash of a DC-10 jet airliner in Chicago in 1979, as well as such general 
features of the world as the nearly elliptical orbits of planets or the electrical conductivity of 
copper. The chief aim of this book is to try to discover just what scientific understanding of this sort 
consists in. (p. 3, emphasis added) 
 
His ambitions are quite high. He hopes to have achieved this aim for all sciences 
except quantum mechanics: 
!
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It is my hope that the causal theory of scientific explanation outlined in this book is reasonably 
adequate for the characterization of explanation in most scientific contexts – in the physical, 
biological, and social sciences – as long as we do not become involved in quantum mechanics. 
(p. 278) 
 
According to Salmon, explaining ... 
 
... involves the placing of the explanandum in a causal network consisting of relevant causal 
interactions that occurred previously and suitable causal processes that connect them to the 
fact-to-be-explained. (1984, p. 269) 
 
The usual label for explanations of this type is “causal-mechanical explanation” 
(abbreviated here as CM explanation). 
These quotes clearly reveal a descriptive aim, which is captured in the following 
hypothesis: 
 
All scientists (except maybe in QM) who have understanding as an aim really 
seek CM-explanations. 
 
The aim of Salmon’s book is to clarify what CM-explanations are and to argue for this 
claim. Salmon only succeeds in the first task: he defines the crucial concepts, viz. 
causal interaction and causal process. Arguments for the descriptive claim are 
missing: there is only the hope to have succeeded (cf. the quote above, which comes 
from the very end of the book). 
Of course we could treat Salmon charitably and claim that he should not have set 
himself descriptive aims that require large scale empirical research for which 
philosophers do not have the (financial) resources and often not the methodological 
skills. He should have stayed where philosophers belong, in the critical and normative 
realm. In other words, he should have put forward the following claim: 
 
All scientists (except maybe in QM) who have understanding as an aim should 
seek CM-explanations (nothing more, nothing less). 
 
Salmon’s book does not contain arguments for this claim, and so he does not do better 
in this respect than Hempel and Kitcher. The three philosophers put a lot of effort in 
clarifying what their (descriptive or normative) claims mean, but the arguments are 
missing. 
 
 
6. A pragmatic approach to studying scientific explanations 
 
We think it is the responsibility of current philosophers of explanation to go on where 
Hempel, Kitcher and Salmon stopped. However, we should go on in a clever way. We 
call this clever way the “pragmatic approach to scientific explanation.” Let us clarify 
what it consists in and defend it. A pragmatic approach to explanation has three 
guiding principles, which we discuss below. 
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Context-dependent normative claims 
The first principle is: make context-dependent normative claims and argue for them. 
This means that you look at how scientists explain in certain disciplines and within 
certain research traditions in a discipline. Philosophers of explanation then can defend 
certain explanatory practices (e.g when other scientists in the discipline deny the 
validity or usefulness of that practice) or criticise explanatory practices. They can also 
try to provide guidelines for improving an explanatory practice. Examples of this can be 
found in Van Bouwel & Weber (2008a) and (2008b) and in De Vreese, Weber & Van 
Bouwel (2010). These papers engage in debates on explanatory practices in the social 
sciences and in the biomedical sciences. Models of scientific explanation as developed 
by philosophers of science are used as tools to make context-dependent normative 
claims. 
The fact that we use traditional models of explanation as toolbox is one of the 
reasons why we call our approach pragmatic (there are more reasons, see below). 
“Pragmatic” thus refers to an “instrumentalist” attitude towards models of explanation: 
we see them as tools in a toolbox, rather than as describing the “essence” of 
explanation or understanding. In doing this, we differ in one important respect from the 
normative endeavours of Hempel, Kitcher and Salmon: the claims we make are 
context-dependent, i.e. they relate to specific types of explanation problems within 
specific disciplines. There are two reasons for this piecemeal approach. First, this 
approach makes the results accessible for the scientists in the relevant disciplines 
(which increases the chance that philosophical reflection has an impact on scientific 
practice). Second, the only way to defend general context-independent normative 
claims is bottom-up (i.e. by generalising from context-dependent claims, if they turn out 
to be similar). Third (and related to the second reason), the context-dependent claims 
are more modest and therefore normally easier to argue for.  
Another difference is that we not only put forward normative claims; we also argue 
for them in our papers (see the papers referred to above). 
 
Context-dependent descriptive claims 
The second principle is: try to make context-dependent descriptive claims and argue 
for them. On the one hand, this means that you try to describe the explanatory practice 
of scientists in a certain discipline or research tradition. For instance, Walmsley (2008) 
describes the practice of explanation in dynamical cognitive scientists and argues that 
they are constructing DN explanations (in Gervais & Weber (2011) it is nonetheless 
shown that this description is inaccurate). In these descriptions, traditional models of 
explanation are used as a toolbox (this is a second reason to call the approach 
pragmatic). The advantages of the piecemeal approach (as compared to the general 
claims made by Hempel, Kitcher and Salmon) are the same as explained above for the 
normative claims. 
Besides focussing on specific scientific disciplines, there is a second way to 
formulate context-dependent descriptive claims: one can select a subtype of 
explanations (e.g. causal explanations of contrasts between facts) and try to get a grip 
on their structure and the factors that determine their explanatory power. An example 
of this can be found in Weber, Van Bouwel & Lefevere 2011: in this paper, the role 
(explanatory value) of unification is investigated for several subtypes of causal 
explanations of facts. The claims made in this approach are general in two respects 
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(they are universally true for clearly identifiable subclasses of explanations and they 
are not limited to one scientific discipline) but at the same time they are 
context-dependent: we do not make claims about the nature of all scientific 
explanations. All claims have a limited area of validity. 
 
Epistemic interests 
The third principle is this: take into account the epistemic interests (i.e. the reason 
scientists have for asking specific explanation-seeking questions) when trying to make 
context-dependent normative or descriptive claims about explanations. These 
epistemic interests have to be taken into account because they influence the type of 
explanation that is appropriate in a given context and also influence which properties of 
an explanation (e.g. depth, deductivity) are important and which not in the given 
context. The relation between epistemic interests, types of explanation and the value 
of properties of explanations is investigated in Weber, Van Bouwel & Vanderbeeken 
(2005) and Weber & Van Bouwel (2007). The use of epistemic interests constitutes a 
third reason to call our approach pragmatic: the idea of epistemic interests originates in 
the work of the American pragmatists (Charles Peirce, John Dewey) and is also clearly 
present in the work of the German pragmatist Jürgen Habermas (who uses the term 
“knowledge-constitutive interest”, see Habermas 1978). 
 
Pragmatic approach versus pragmatic theory 
Our pragmatic approach to explanations should not be confused with a pragmatic 
theory of explanation as developed by e.g. Bas van Fraassen (1980). According to a 
pragmatic (also known as erotetic) theory of explanations, an explanation is an answer 
to a why-question that uses the appropriate relevance relation. Which relevance 
relation is appropriate depends on the context. Though this theory is much vaguer than 
the model of e.g. Hempel, Kitcher and Salmon, it is still a theory about what an 
explanation is. Our proposal – the pragmatic approach – is situated at the meta-level: it 
is a proposal on how to study scientific explanation. One of the ingredients of the 
approach – as outlined above – is that we use models of explanations as instruments. 
So we stop making claims about the nature of explanations. We don’t even make 
vague claims like in the pragmatic theory. 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we have presented the descriptive and normative claims on scientific 
explanation that Hempel, Kitcher and Salmon make by means of their explicata. We 
have identified a major shortcoming which they have in common: they don’t gather 
empirical evidence for their descriptive hypotheses (this could be done by 
systematically investigating the writings of a large representative sample of scientists) 
and don’t argue for their normative claims either.  
 Since it is – in our view – about time for philosophers of explanation to improve our 
ways of studying scientific explanation, we presented our pragmatic approach to 
studying scientific explanation as a better way to proceed. The main differences of 
what we propose – compared to Hempel, Kitcher and Salmon – are: 
context-dependence of the normative and descriptive claims, providing arguments 
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instead of merely putting forward hypotheses, and the role of epistemic interests. 
 Let us conclude this paper by going back to Carnap’s idea of explication. The 
pragmatic approach we defend still assumes that we develop explicata as a first step in 
the analysis of explanations: we propose to use them – in the same way as Hempel, 
Kitcher and Salmon did – to put forward descriptive and normative claims. The reason 
is that without explicata we have no precise claims. And if the meaning of the claims 
remains vague, we cannot develop decent arguments. So if we want to develop 
arguments, we need explicata. However, our approach requires that we give up an 
implicit assumption which Carnap makes. Carnap seems to assume that philosophers 
of science can get far by developing one explicatum for a given explicandum (e.g. 
probability or explanation). Hempel, Kitcher and Salmon certainly assume this: they 
are convinced that their explicatum will do all the work (maybe leaving out some 
“strange” fields like QM, cf. Salmon). Our pragmatic approach rejects this monism and 
adopts pluralism as a heuristic guideline: in principle, every explicatum that has been 
developed by a philosopher of explanation in the past can be used to formulate a 
context-dependent descriptive or normative hypothesis that is then further 
investigated. In the end – after analysing all explanatory practices of scientists – it may 
turn out that all explicata except one are superfluous. However, an a priori choice for 
monism is an overhasty conclusion which is unfounded at this moment and thus – from 
a methodological point of view -- a bad start for studying scientific explanation. 
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Appendix: Hempel’s DN-model and its problems 
 
The DN model 
Because Hempel's deductive-nomological model of explanation is very well known, we will use this 
model as a starting-point. According to Hempel, we have to distinguish between true explanations and 
explanations that are well-confirmed (see e.g. Hempel 1965, p. 338). Both concepts are defined by 
means of the auxiliary concept of potential explanans, which is characterized as follows (cfr. Hempel & 
Oppenheim (1948), part 3; readers who are well acquainted with Hempel's DN model will notice that we 
make some simplifications): 
 
(H) The ordered couple (L,C) constitutes an potential explanans for the singular sentence E if and only if 
(1) L is a purely universal sentence and C is a singular sentence, 
(2) E is deductively derivable from the conjunction L&C, and 
(3) E is not deductively derivable from C alone. 
 
A purely universal sentence consists of one or more universal quantifiers, followed by an expression 
which contains no quantifiers and no individual constants. (L,C) is a true explanans for E if and only if 
(L,C) is a potential explanans for E and both L and C are true. (L,C) is a well-confirmed explanans for E 
if and only if (L,C) is a potential explanans for E and both L and C are well-confirmed. 
Let's consider an example (inspired by an example in Hempel & Oppenheim (1948), p. 246). A 
mercury thermometer is rapidly immersed in hot water. We observe a temporary drop of the mercury 
column, followed by a swift rise. According to definition (H), the following construction is a potential 
explanans for this phenomenon: 
 
C1: This thermometer consists of a glass tube which is partly filled with mercury. 
C2: This thermometer was rapidly immersed in hot water. 
L: In glass tubes which are partly filled with mercury and are rapidly immersed in hot water, the mercury 
level first drops and then rises. 
 
If all these claims are true, we have a true explanation. 
 
Accidental generalisations 
Hempel realised that he needed to distinguish between genuine laws and accidental generalizations. 
Consider the following two statements, apparently equivalent as far as their logical form goes (see 
Salmon (1989), p. 15): 
 
(i) No gold sphere has a mass greater than 100,000 kg. 
(ii) No enriched uranium sphere has a mass greater than 100,000 kg. 
 
Whereas the second statement seems to be the expression of a lawful fact (since the critical mass for 
enriched uranium is just a few kilograms), the truth of the first statement seems to be a contingent matter 
of fact (it just happens to be the case that no one did produce such a sphere as yet). 
Hempel’s example is this: if we derive that Horace is bald from the premises (i) that Horace is a 
member of the Greenbury School Board, and (ii) that all members of the Greenbury School Board are 
bald, this is not an explanation because we have used an accidental generalisation. Hempel’s problem 
is that he has no viable account of how to distinguish between laws and accidental generalisation (he 
admits this). 
 
Irrelevant premises 
Several people have offered counterexamples to Hempel’s models.  The first group of examples are 
inspired by the fact that the relation of logical deduction is monotonous: if you add premises to a 
deductive argument, the result is still a deductive argument. This is not the case for explanations: most 
people will not regard arguments with superfluous premises (that otherwise satisfy Hempel’s conditions) 
as explanations. Well known examples are: 
 
(1) This sample of tables salt dissolves in water because I have hexed it, and all samples of hexed salt 
dissolve in water. 
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The problem is that non-hexed salt also dissolves in water. 
 
(2) John Jones did not get pregnant during the last year because he took birth control pills, and men who 
take birth control pills don’t get pregnant. 
Here the premise about the birth control pills is superfluous. 
 
(3) It was almost certain that John Jones would recover from his cold in less than one week, because he 
took vitamin C and almost all colds disappear within one week after taking vitamin C. 
 
Here the problem is that almost all colds disappear within one week, even without vitamin C. 
This problem can be solved by adding a criterion (requirement that no premise is redundant) to 
Hempel’s model. 
 
Asymmetry 
Several people have argued that explanation is asymmetrical. Because arguments can be reversed, this 
asymmetry is a problem for Hempel’s models. Consider the following questions and answers: 
  
Question 1 
Why does this flagpole have a shadow of 10 metres long? 
Answer 1 
The flagpole is 10 metres high. The sun is at 45° above the horizon. 
Because light moves in a straight line, we can derive (by means of the Pythagorean Theorem) that 
the flagpole has a shadow of 10 metres long. 
 
Question 2 
Why is this flagpole 10 metres long? 
Answer 2 
The flagpole has a shadow of 10 metres long. The sun is at 45° above the horizon. 
Because light moves in a straight line, we can derive (by means of the Pythagorean Theorem) that 
the flagpole is 10 metres high. 
 
The problem is that only the first argument is an intuitively acceptable explanation, while both answers 
are DN explanations in Hempel’s sense. 
Another famous example is the pendulum. The pendulum law (P=2π.√L/g) describes the relation  
between the length of a pendulum (L) ans its period (P). Consider the following questions and answers: 
 
Question 1 
Why does this pendulum have a period of 2.006 seconds? 
Answer 1 
The pendulum is 1 metre long. From this it can be derived by means of the pendulum law that its 
period is 2.006 seconds. 
 
Question 2 
Why does this pendulum have a length of 1 metre? 
Answer 2 
The pendulum has a period of 2.006 seconds. From this it can be derived by means of the pendulum 
law that it has a length of 1 metre. 
 
Again we have two arguments satisfying Hempel’s criteria, but only one intuitively acceptable 
explanation. 
Hempel did not regard asymmetry as a problem: for him these examples show that we have bad 
intuitions about explanations. Once we realise that understanding equals expectability, we can get rid of 
the bad intuitions (because we realise that explanations are symmetrical). 
